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The Pythagorean Table of Opposites,
Symbolic Classification, and Aristotle
Owen Goldin

Philosophy Department, Marquette University, Milwaukee, WI

Argument

At Metaphysics A 5 986a22-b2, Aristotle refers to a Pythagorean table, with two columns of paired
opposites. I argue that 1) although Burkert and Zhmud have argued otherwise, there is sufficient
textual evidence to indicate that the table, or one much like it, is indeed of Pythagorean origin; 2)
research in structural anthropology indicates that the tables are a formalization of arrays of "symbolic
classification" which express a pre-scientific world view with social and ethical implications, according
to which the presence of a principle on one column of the table will carry with it another principle
within the same column; 3) a close analysis of Aristotle's arguments shows that he thought that the
table expresses real causal relationships; and 4) Aristotle faults the table of opposites with positing its
principles as having universal application and with not distinguishing between those principles that are
causally prior and those that are posterior. Aristotle's account of scientific explanation and his own
explanations that he developed in accordance with this account are in part the result of his critical
encounter with this prescientific Pythagorean table.

At Metaphysics A 5 986a22-b2, Aristotle refers to a conceptual scheme in which certain Pythagoreans
posited a table with two columns of paired opposites. The context is Aristotle's review of the sorts of
causal principles to which his predecessors appealed. Aristotle distinguishes between two explanatory
schemes offered by different Pythagoreans. Some take the principles of things to be numbers. 1A
second group posits contraries as the principles of things, and arranges them in two columns: "Others
among them say there are ten principles, laying them out in columns - limit and unlimited, odd and
even, one and plurality, right and left, male and female, resting and moving, straight and curved, light
and darkness, good and bad, square and oblong" (986a22-6).
Much concerning this table is unclear: 1) To what to extent is the table of opposites to which Aristotle
refers, or one like it, of Pythagorean provenance? 2) What role did the table and the relationships it
expresses play in Pythagorean life and thought? 3) Aristotle apparently takes the table to serve as a
legitimate endoxon, from which metaphysical, scientific, and ethical inquiries are to begin, and by
which such accounts are to be tested. For them to play this role, such endoxa get at least something
right. What is it, in this case? 4) How does Aristotle think the relationships expressed in the tables are
to be corrected or developed?
Aristotle says so little, and direct evidence is so scarce, that any attempt to answer these questions
must be speculative. Nonetheless, answers can be given with a reasonable degree of plausibility. In the
present paper I argue that 1) although Burkert and Zhmud have argued otherwise, there is sufficient
textual evidence to indicate that the table, or one much like it, is indeed of Pythagorean origin; 2)
research in structural anthropology indicates that the tables are a formalization of arrays of "symbolic
classification" which express, however inchoately, a pre-scientific world view with social and ethical
implications, according to which the presence of a principle on one column of the table will carry with
it, or otherwise be associated with, another principle within the same column; 3) Aristotle thought that
the table expresses real causal, conceptual, and metaphysical relationships; and 4) Aristotle faults the
table of opposites with positing its principles as having universal application and with not distinguishing
between those principles that are causally prior and those that are posterior.

Is the Pythagorean Table Pythagorean?

That the table of opposites, a version of which is mentioned in Metaphysics A 5, derives from the early
Pythagoreans requires some defense, as the Pythagorean origin of the table has come under
considerable suspicion in recent years.
Scholarly orthodoxy today minimizes the importance of Aristotle's testimony concerning the table of
opposites for our understanding of Pythagorean thought. Thus, Burkert argues that important
elements of the table derive from Speusippus or other figures in the early Academy and concludes:
There is even more uncertainty latent in the possibilities of interpretation than in chronology. Is such a
rigid scheme the result of true philosophical reflection, or of a primitive way of thinking? Or is it the
expression of a strictly regimented way of life? We can see what the Platonists made of it, but it is not
a helpful foundation for a reconstruction of Pythagorean philosophy. (Burkert 1972, 52)
Zhmud supports Burkert: "however much in its detail the table ultimately derives from the
Pythagorean tradition, in its final form of the ten pairs of distinct kindred (or similar) opposites it is a

product of the Academic systematisation, and exactly this form and not the opposites themselves were
of interest to Aristotle" (Zhmud 1998, 266; see also Frank 1923, 254-255, and Zhmud 2012, 451-452). I
argue that Aristotle's testimony can be regarded as having two components: 1) that the early
Pythagoreans arrayed associated opposites in a table comprised of two columns, and 2) that these
opposites were only the ten identified by Aristotle. Burkert's and Zhmud's arguments, which are not
decisive, are directed to the second point, but leave Aristotle's testimony untouched in regard to the
first. That alone, when considered in relation to other evidence, allows us to draw probable inferences
concerning Pythagorean modes of explanation.
The main - and sole - piece of direct evidence in favor of a Pythagorean origin to the table is of course,
Aristotle's own word, which is found both within Metaphysics A 5, and within his lost treatise on
Pythagorean doctrines, for which Simplicius provides evidence.2It goes without saying that Aristotle
had access to texts and testimony lost to us; his evidence is to be rejected only if (as is admittedly often
the case with the Presocratics) his account is inconsistent with other reliable evidence.
Burkert points to circumstantial evidence that suggests that the opposites presented as principles
derive from Speusippus or other members of the early Academy, who, in an attempt to give his own
account the legitimacy of antiquity, ascribe it to the Pythagoreans (Burkert 1972, 51-2). 3Zhmud points
to how the table as reported by Aristotle has ten rows. Speusippus devoted a half of his On
Pythagorean Numbers to the special properties of the number ten, while there is no evidence that it
had such a role for earlier Pythagoreans. Further, the table as reported by Aristotle contains the
theoretical oppositions of limit and unlimited and of rest and motion, which have special theoretical
interest for Plato, and omits opposites like hot and cold, and wet and dry, which we know to have
played crucial roles in the physical explanations of the early Pythagoreans and their contemporaries
(Zhmud 1998, 259-66).
These arguments suggest that, as Burkert puts it, "'the table of opposites' is quite closely connected
with Academic doctrines; we have here a continuous transition between Pythagorean and Platonic"
doctrines (Burkert 1972, 51; quoted with approval by Zhmud 2012, 339). That said, Zhmud's argument
that the Pythagoreans ascribed no special status to the number ten, which directly contradicts
Aristotle's testimony at 986a8-10, 4is an argument from the silence of a very few sources, concerning a
group that is at least reputed to hold many doctrines in secret.5(And could a group that ascribed some
importance to number - the nature of which is admittedly unclear - have failed to be struck by how
human beings have ten fingers and ten toes, and employ what we now refer to as a base ten number
system?).6Further, although the table as Aristotle presents it does seem to include Platonic and postPlatonic theoretical principles, it also includes oppositions such as right and left, and male and female,
drawn from common experience. As Kahn points out, "The way in which abstract and concrete,
mathematical and moral-aesthetic opposites are jumbled together here may indicate an archaic origin.
And the absence of the One-Dyad pair suggests that the list is independent of the main postSpeusippean tradition" (Kahn 2001, 65-66). 7
In contrast to uncertain but important evidence suggesting that not all of the opposites identified
derived from the Pythagoreans, there is no evidence at all suggesting that Aristotle is not to be taken
at his word in taking the tabular presentation of opposed principles to be original to certain earlier
Pythagoreans. There is no parallel in Plato, and no reason for arranging and presenting opposed

principles in this way is suggested by the theoretical accounts of the early Academy. On the contrary,
as we shall see, the table is consonant with anthropological evidence concerning ways in which
features of the world are classified in ritualistic cultures, and with testimony concerning both
Pythagorean science and the Pythagoreans' shared way of life.
In the absence of independent evidence (which we do have for right and left) we lack full confidence in
ascribing to the table the definite pairs of opposites that Aristotle ascribes to the table.8Yet, Burkert
and Zhmud err on the other extreme by excluding the possibility that Aristotle relates valuable
information concerning those opposites that the Pythagoreans employed as principles. I therefore
proceed on the presumption that we are to respect Aristotle's report that a group of early
Pythagoreans, distinguished from those who emphasized the importance of numbers, isolated certain
pairs of opposites as having a privileged status as explanatory principles. The identity and perhaps the
number of paired opposites may have been fluid, 9but the tabular form in which Aristotle presents
them is original to Pythagorean theorists. I shall argue that there is sufficient evidence to allow us to
see the theoretical use to which this tabular presentation was put. I shall further argue that Aristotle
himself grasped the structural features of the explanations based on the table, and that while he in
part endorses the worth of the table as providing reputable opinions ( endoxa) from which scientific
explanation begins, he also explicitly points to the inadequacy of the table as an expression of the
causal and explanatory arrangements.

Symbolic Associations

Beyond the testimony of Aristotle and other texts that derived from that, we lack direct evidence of
the sort of thinking that may have given rise to the table of opposites. That is not to say that we are
without resources that allow us to reconstruct what the Pythagoreans were up to in tabulating
opposites as they did. Anthropologists have shown that within many pre-scientific cultures there are
shared modes of conceptualizing oppositions that have in common the core features of the table of
opposites. We can extrapolate from the meaning and structure found in the other cultures, to that
given by the early Pythagoreans. These results are speculative, but are confirmed by other testimony
concerning Pythagorian thought and way of life.
A fundamental principle of the tradition of anthropology initiated by Durkheim is that the geographical
array of living quarters, social practices, myths,10and other varieties of lore share certain structural
features, sometimes unique to a society, sometimes shared by a number of them, which result from
underlying modes of association and conceptualization. For Durkheim, the most fundamental instance
of how such structures are reflected in both ways of thought and ways of social life is the bifurcation
between the spheres of the sacred and the profane, and the sacred itself is further divided into the
beneficent and maleficent (Durkheim 1912, 412-414). Durkheim's student Hertz applied this strategy
to culturally determined modes of conceptualizing opposites.
Hertz pointed out that there are many cultures whose beliefs and practices involve the arranging of
opposites in two groups. Hertz studied the widespread association of the right and left hands with the
polarity between the sacred and the profane, respectively. For those who belong to cultures with
something like a table of opposites as a basic conceptual scheme, "the whole universe is divided into
two contrasted spheres: things, beings, and powers attract or repel each other, implicate or exclude

each other, according to whether they gravitate toward one or the other poles" (Hertz 1960, 96).
According to this scheme, the whole sphere of the sacred is marked by a number of features that are
associated with and accompany each other. 11The pre-scientific cultures that are the focus of Hertz's
study employ associations among opposites as a kind of sympathetic magic, by which one could bring
about one opposite on the side of mana by virtue of another opposite that is associated with it in the
same column.
Hertz's work foreshadows twentieth-century structural anthropology, and many of his insights have
been validated.12But anthropologists and historians of religion came to abandon the thesis of a shared
belief across pre-scientific cultures of a sacred force or mana (see, for example, Eliade 1958, 19-23). By
the time the Pythagorean table of opposites was again considered from the standpoint of structural
anthropology, the anthropological analyses were being given not in terms of the role that these
opposites play in a presupposed underlying ontology, but in terms of the symbolic meaning of
opposites.13
G. E. R. Lloyd demonstrated the pervasive influence of fundamental polarities in Greek early science,
including that of the Pythagorean table, in order to show that Greek science was determined by and
dependent upon conceptual structures that pervaded Greek thought long before Greek theorizing
concerning the natural world, and which persisted even as they shaped such theorizing (Lloyd 1991,
27-48, and 1966, 15-171). Among such conceptual structures are the prioritizing of right over left and
the association of the right-hand side with other positively favored characteristics, in contrast with the
negatively regarded characters associated with the left. Lloyd acknowledges and builds on Hertz's work
and, like Hertz, prominently features the Pythagorean tables as an outstanding exemplification of
these sorts of persistent cross-cultural structures. Lloyd, following anthropological developments,
avoids Hertz's talk of a metaphysics of mana, and speaks instead of such a table as offering symbolic
associations.
The notion of a symbol in contemporary anthropology, however, is somewhat vague. "Symbols," in this
sense, are not linguistic signs, by which one object refers to another. They are terms, concepts, social
structures, practices, or aspects of human social life that, along with other such items form patterns of
association within a society. These associations tend to reinforce themselves, so that a pattern in social
life, for example, will be reflected by a similar pattern in myth, religious practice, medical lore, and the
like. Some patterns may well have a kind of causal priority over others; that is to say, those embedded
within social structures may be responsible for similar patterns in myth or in the physical layout of
dwellings - indeed, anthropologists tend to focus on such linkages. But there is no reason in principle
why those who subscribe to such associations might not think that an asymmetry in geographical
layout is responsible for an asymmetry in political power. So understood, the structure of symbolic
associations may constitute a world view by which explanations are offered or, as in the case of
magical or medical practice, exploited to some practical end. But it need not; a structured array of such
associations may exist in the absence of any such metaphysical account. Alternatively, such an account
may exist, but only as partial, its components arising only as particular answers to particular "why"
questions; indeed, such ad hoc answers may not have arisen at all except as a response to the "why"
questions being asked by anthropologists trying to reconstruct an alien worldview.

Symbolism, as understood by anthropologists, is a bond between concepts or entities that are loosely
associated with one another, such that, within a society for which the symbolic meaning holds, the
presence of the symbolized will be thought to be fitting or appropriate given the presence of a symbol.
Hence, symbolic correlations need not be thought of as indicating explicit belief in causal or logical
necessitation. Nonetheless, if one lives in a society, or a world, in which things are thought to be
ordered as they should be, given the symbol it is only to be expected that it will be accompanied by
that with which it is associated, the symbolized. The two in some loose sense go together. What
evidence is there that the table of opposites is an expression of patterns of symbolic association, so
understood?

Pythagorean Symbola of the Divine

It is a matter of controversy to what extent the early philosophers would have recognized a distinction
between their activity as teachers, rendering the world intelligible, and their activity as leaders of
religious communities, claiming special abilities, inculcating others in prescribed ways of life, and
leading others to a kind of transformation. Within the community of Pythagoreans both activities seem
to have been interrelated (see Riedweg 2008, 42-97). 14Iamblichus, in passages that are generally
accepted as derived from Aristotle's lost On the Pythagoreans (see Burkert 1972, 170),15tells us that
among the Pythagoreans the right shoe was put on first, and the left foot was the first to be washed
(Protrepticus 21, DK 58C6; see also VP 83,12). The favoring of the right is not here explicitly associated
with other opposites, but it is at Plutarch, De vitioso pudore 532C 1-3: "the Pythagoreans were always
careful to not place the left leg over the right or to choose an even number instead of the odd, all other
things being equal" and Iamblichus, de vita Pythagorica 156, 5-9: "He ordered entering temples from
the right, but departing from the left, postulating that the right is a principle of the numbers called
'odd,' and is divine, and that the left is a sign (symbolon) of the 'even' and of what is subject to
dissolution" (Dillon and Hershbell 1991). We note that the right and the even are given positive
evaluation, as they are in the table of opposites, and that the right and left are called principles, just as
they are in the context of Aristotle's account of the Pythagorean columns. They too are called symbola.
What sense can symbolon have in this context? The term is one often used in Neoplatonic thought to
refer to a saying whose significance needs to be inferred through the working through of analogous
relationships, and it is often so used in reference to gnomic Pythagorean sayings (on this, see Dillon
1976). But that cannot be the sense in which each opposite can be said to be a symbol, as the
Pythagoreans would not have understood the principle as such to be a saying.16Two opposites that lie
in the same column would have been called symbola in order to indicate that each opposite either
brought with it, or led to the reception of, an opposite found within the same column. I suggest, then,
that in referring to Pythagorean opposites as symbola, our sources are employing the term in its
original sense, as a half of a whole, from which the presence, and nature of another half can be
inferred, and that for this reason symbola was likely to have been the term used by Aristotle, if not by
the Pythagoreans themselves.17
So if this is the sense in which the right hand side is a symbolon of the divine, by entering the temple
on the right, one is causing another divinity, or other positively evaluated opposites, to be present. To
say that the right hand side and the good (or divine) are in the same column on the table of opposites
would not only be a theoretical truth; but of practical use as well, via a precept of the Pythagorean

code of life. Like other prescribed practices (such as the notorious prohibition against eating beans)
those concerning appropriate use of right and left feet or hands would have been primarily understood
as elements of a way of life, shared by fellow members of the community. This code of life is
prescribed not only because it has inherent value, but also because of the positive consequences to
which such a way of life is thought to lead. 18And this code of life, like those of other many prescientific peoples, is both based on and perpetuates a system of "symbolic classification." The table of
opposites is a way of presenting those conceptual associations that ground the Pythagorean way of life
in a way that makes them available for theoretical inspection. 19
The Pythagorean table is unique insofar as it is the result, not of anthropological studies of an alien
culture (and is therefore not the artifact of an anthropological attempt to schematize associations
made by those who likely had no interest at all in schematization), but of those whose beliefs and
practices themselves display the associations in question. The Pythagorean table is a self-conscious
formalization of symbolic associations that pervaded Pythagorean lore and practice. There are three
aspects of this account that are of note. First, it involves recognition that conceptual or symbolic
associations have been present in the world and in thought, and are available for formal
systematization by virtue of which they can be made explicit. (As such, it is analogous to the function of
legislation as a codification of shared standards of conduct. In both cases, explicit formulation of
modes of categorization are means by which society achieves a kind of self consciousness.) Second, it
shows explicit awareness that things, and the way in which we are to think about things, involve binary
oppositions. 20Third, it shows explicit awareness that some of these oppositions have some kind of
priority over others. The positing of the table is itself a kind of record of theorizing - the compilers wish
to see the relationships among various kinds of associations at a glance. The Pythagoreans took a step
beyond the Milesians, who were also engaged in theoretical study or philosophy, insofar as they
identified associations and gave genetic accounts of the processes that lead to familiar entities and
process. In Aristotle's terms (and, perhaps, their own) they explicitly identify principles as principles.
Just as the visual schematization of social structures into a table of columns is an attempt by
anthropologists to allow for theoretical reflection concerning them, so the setting out of opposed
principles in tabular form by the Pythagoreans was an effort to allow for theoretical reflection
concerning the theoretical grasp of principles. 21
Anthropological evidence allows us to appreciate both the practical and the theoretical aspects of the
Pythagorean table of opposites. The table has its roots in cultural associations that were the bases for
rituals and practices of various kinds; it schematized these associations in a way that made them
available for theoretical study. Aristotle's discussion, which focuses on the theoretical aspect alone,
confirms this conclusion, and provides more evidence concerning the explanatory use to which the
table of opposites was put.

How Were the Pythagorean Opposites Associated?

Aristotle often makes appeal to associated pairs of opposites that seem to be taken from the
Pythagorean table, or from a table like it (with which he assumes familiarity).22He does not question
certain commonly accepted associations, such as that between the good and the limited (Nicomachean
Ethics 2 6 1106b29-30) or that between the good and the right side.23When reviewing the principles
identified by his predecessors, Aristotle remarks that they all picked pairs of contraries (hot/cold,

wet/dry, odd/even, love/strife, great/small, dense/rare?) that were all taken "from the same column"
(Physics 1.5 189a1). What could this be referring to if not the Pythagorean table, or one derived from it
(preserving its formal structure, but substituting alternative opposed pairs)?24
Metaphysics N 6 1093b7-18 mentions the table of opposites in the context of a discussion of those
who make number the principle of all things:
If mathematical objects be conceived as these thinkers conceive them, evidently goodness is
predicable of them, and the odd, the straight, the equal-by-equal, and the powers of certain numbers,
are in the column of the beautiful. For the seasons and a particular number go together; and the other
agreements that they collect from the theorems of mathematics all have this meaning. Hence they are
like coincidences. For they are accidents, but appropriate to one another, and one by analogy.
Here we have confirmation that the compilers of a table of opposites25are said to posit these opposites
as regularly concurrent. Items in the same column are predicated of the same things, so that items in
one column bring out the presence of other items in the same column.26This is the sort of association
of opposites that we have seen to be a common structural feature of pre-scientific thought and
practice.
Aristotle contrasts the Pythagorean table of contraries with a similar use of contraries by Alcmaeon in
his medical and physiological accounts; the Pythagorean account has the advantage of determining
exactly how many correlated contraries serve as principles, and which they are ( Metaphysics A 5
986a31-b2).27According to Aristotle, the list of correlated opposites that Aristotle gives us are not
merely examples of the sorts of opposites that the Pythagoreans took to serve as principles - it is these
ten and not others that are said to uniquely have this role.
Within On the Heavens 2.2, Aristotle tells us of the zoological and cosmological use to which the
Pythagoreans put the opposition of left and right (found in the table). He writes:
Since there are some who say that there is for the heavens a right and a left, as do the so-called
Pythagoreans - for this is their account - we must investigate whether, if we are obligated to apply
these principles to the body of the universe, things are as they say, or are they rather otherwise.
(284b6-9)
According to the Pythagoreans, a pair of opposites that has application to one domain, the human
body, is thought to have application to another domain, the cosmos as a whole. Why? Simplicius, who
had at least indirect access to Aristotle's more comprehensive account of Pythagorean doctrines in the
lost On the Pythagoreans,28notes that the attribution of right and left to the cosmos follows from their
presence in the table of opposites:
Aristotle understands them to have said that right and left are found in all things. On account of the
fact that they took right and left to be a single principle from the ten rows, which they said29were
principles common to all things, since their study of these things was not exclusively concerned with
the heavens. (386, 4-8)30
Simplicius reports that the directions right and left apply to the cosmos as a whole, because they are
principles of every being.31In the presumption that Simplicius' account reflects his Aristotelian source,

we can conclude that, according to Aristotle, the opposites arrayed in the table are not simply
principles of certain kinds of things; each of them (whether in itself or as paired with its opposite is not
clear) is a principle of anything. 32Simplicius informs us that Aristotle is not attributing this inference to
the Pythagoreans as one explicit in the text. Rather, the universal applicability of the opposites is
inferred from other uses to which Aristotle saw the opposites of the table being put.
What does it mean to say that all opposites apply to all things (pantÅn)? A strong reading would have it
that both of a pair of opposites apply to every particular being that is, even those that would ordinarily
be characterized by one opposite to the exclusion of the other. Although it would make sense to say
that the right hand itself has both a right and a left side, it is hard to see what could have induced the
Pythagoreans to say that both of the opposites straight and curved serve as principles of an entity that
is straight. Accordingly, we are on safer ground in attributing to the Pythagoreans (as interpreted by
Aristotle) the principle that each pair of opposites serves as a principle of every kind of thing. For
example, every object has a right or left, straightness or curvedness, etc. The way in which these
principles apply would be responsible for the distinctive characteristic of each thing. We note that such
a reading still leads to apparently counterintuitive results. How is it that a number has a right or left
side? How is it that an apple is either odd or even? It is not clear what answer the Pythagoreans would
have given to these questions. Recall, however, the anthropological evidence we have reviewed
concerning the sort of "symbolic associations" expressed in the table of opposites. That an opposite on
one column carries with it other opposites in the same column suggests a kind of identity of all
associated opposites. Thus, Physics 3.1 201b18-23 takes motion to have been said to be difference and
the indefinite, insofar as all of these opposites were taken to be in the same column insofar as they are
privation. Perhaps one can say that the oddness of the apple is found not only where there is an odd
number of apples, but in the right hand side of the apple, or in any positive, determinate feature of the
apple.
Aristotle confirms this interpretation, according to which the table of opposites is not simply to be read
horizontally, by which a principle is paired with its proper opposite (as is apparently the case in the
thought of Alcmaeon), but is also to be read vertically. Opposites in the same column are - somehow to be associated with each other. This association is symmetrical. 33In the case of some of these
associations, Aristotle reports that one opposite is the other, but it is not at all clear that what is
involved is the "is" of identity. Thus, for example, when reviewing the endoxa concerning what motion
is, Aristotle considers some (presumably followers of Plato) to say that motion is the different or
unequal or non-being (heteroteta kai anisoteta kai to me on phaskontes einai ten kinesin, Physics 3.2
201b20-1).34Their reasoning is based on an appeal to the table of opposites: "the reason why they
posit motion among these things is the fact that it seems to be something indefinite, and the principles
that belong to the one column are indefinite because they are privative, for none of them is either a
'this' or a 'such' or any of the other [categories]" (201b24-7). Aristotle's response is that motion cannot
be the different, indefinite, or unequal, as these sorts of things need not move. This remark makes
clear that Aristotle takes those of his predecessors that made use of the table of opposites to take the
items in the same column of the table to be mutually coextensive. In all cases in which an opposite A
on one side of the table is associated with 35an opposite B on the same side of the table, something is A
if and only if it is B.36

Aristotle on the Asymmetry of Causation

On the basis of both direct and indirect evidence, we see that Aristotle reads the Pythagorean table as
an account of metaphysical and physical principles, articulating the ontological and causal structure of
the world. On his account, the table isolates and explicates explanatory and metaphysical relationships
that hold among various things and characteristics, explaining where and when they are present. As
such, the Pythagorean table is a significant step forward in the project of rendering the world
intelligible. However, the opposites that are identified as theoretical principles are not ranked in any
systematic way. There is no causal priority between any two contraries found within the same column.
If, for example, the right hand is associated with the male, and the left hand is associated with the
female, it might be the case that gestation on the right hand side of the womb leads to male offspring,
as it does according to the account of Parmenides (B 17). But on the Pythagorean account, the
converse relation no doubt held as well. Thus, as Lloyd (1991, 27-48) has pointed out, the superior and
comparative strength of the right hand was taken to be a given among the Greeks. The right hand
would not be taken to be on the right because it is stronger; rather, the hand would be thought
stronger because it is to the right. Symmetrical relations of entailment are posited among the
explanatory principles.
Aristotle cannot accept this possibility. His general argument against the conversion of explanans and
explanandum is offered in Posterior Analytics 1. 2-3. The argument in outline is as follows: The
identification of a cause within an explanatory context is an explanation. One with the ability to give
the relevant explanations concerning a genus has scientific knowledge, or episteme, concerning that
genus. The optimal form in which such explanations are to be expressed is that of demonstration. The
premises of such demonstrations must express ultimate causes. This is because any premise for which
there are more fundamental explanatory causes would be subject to the question "why?" which would
contaminate the intelligibility of the demonstrative conclusion; that demonstration would not
ultimately answer the question as to why the conclusion is the case. If cause and effect had a
symmetrical relationship, scientific explanations would be circular; Aristotle argues that
demonstrations that were on the basis of such relationships would fail to show anything at all. Hence
explanation, and the causal relationships that explanation makes clear, must rest on "principles" that
stand in an asymmetrical relationship with that for which they are principles. Principles, for which
there is nothing prior, must be first in the orders of explanation and causation.
In what follows I shall argue that Aristotle's main objection to the table of opposites, understood as an
ontological and causal schema, is that it is oblivious to relations of causal and explanatory priority.

Aristotle's Objections to the Logic of the Pythagorean Table

Aristotle's indictment of the Pythagoreans for not recognizing the symmetrical relation between
principle and that of which a principle is a principle is found within On the Heavens 2.2. The passage is
long, but, because of the complexity in the argument and the importance of Aristotle's wording, it
needs to be quoted nearly in its entirety:
First, if right and left are present, we must grant that even prior principles are present in it. Now these
principles have been distinguished in the lectures on the motion of animals, for the reason that they
belong to their nature. For in some animals it is evident that all such parts (I mean, for example, right

and left) are present - and in others some of them - but in plants only up and down. Now if we must
apply to the heavens something like these distinctions, it is, as we have said, reasonable that those
[orientations] that are present in animals are present in it, especially the primary one. There are three
of them, and each is as it were a principle. The three I am speaking of are up and down, front and its
opposite, and right and left - for it is reasonable that all of these dimensions apply to complete bodies.
. . . Further, they can be . . . understood in regard to motions; I mean that the principles are those parts
from which motions begin, for those that have them. Growth begins from what is up, motion in place
from the right, and the senses from what is in front (for by "front" I mean that to which the senses are
oriented). This is why we ought not look for above and below, right and left, and front and back, in
every body, only those that, because they are alive, have a principle of movement within themselves. .
. . This is why one might find it surprising that the Pythagoreans said that there are only these two
principles, right and left, but omitted the other four, which are no less important. . . . While up and
down are found in all living things alike, animals and plants, right and left are not present in plants.
Further, insofar as length is prior to breadth, if up is the principle of length, and right of breadth, and if
the principle of that which is prior is prior, then up is prior to right - in regard to [the order of] coming
to be, since 'prior' has more than one sense. In addition to these points, if up is that out of which
( hothen) motion proceeds, right the region from which (aph' hou) it proceeds, and front the region to
which it is oriented, then for this reason too, up has a certain status of a principle (tina dunamin
arkhes) in relation to the other forms. On these two grounds, then, they deserve blame, because they
omit the more important principles, and because they thought that they belonged to all things alike.
(On the Heavens 2.2 284b10-285a27)37
The Pythagoreans are developing a theoretical account of the cosmos and the motions found within it.
They do so by isolating a pair of opposites (right and left) as principles and applying them to the
cosmos in a way that incorrectly posits Europe as up and to the right (285b25-7). We note that both
the Pythagoreans and Aristotle pair the opposites right and left with another pair of opposites: up and
down. Although up and down are not posited as principle opposites within the table of opposites, they
are to be associated with the opposites light and dark, which are also present. Within the Pythagorean
account, one pair of opposites is associated with another pair of opposites, and opposites are
employed as explanatory principles in contexts where their applicability is immediately evident,
indicating that certain oppositions are taken to be of extensive, if not universal, application.
Fundamental to Aristotle's critique is his insistence that principles of explanation be proper to a genus.
We have seen evidence that the Pythagoreans took right and left to be principles
of universal application. Aristotle, in contrast, takes right and left to be biological principles, applicable
to only those living beings that are capable of motion. Since biology and cosmology are different
disciplines, dealing with different kinds of things, it would seem as though right and left do not apply to
the cosmos as a whole at all. Nevertheless, Aristotle does take them to apply, for the cosmos, as divine
(1.9 279a18-30), is thought to be alive (2.2 285a29). Not only is it alive, it is in motion by virtue of an
inner principle, and for this reason is thought to be an animal of sorts. As such, cosmology and
terrestrial biology can be understood as branches of a more general biology, and the kinds studied by
each will share key attributes, like the duality between right and left. Among animals, the right side has
been empirically identified as the principle of motion ( Progression of Animals 4 705b22-706a26);
accordingly Aristotle identifies the right as the principle of motion of all living beings that have a left

and a right side, including the cosmos as a whole. Since he understands right and left to be principles of
motion, and the heavens rotate, there can be no determinate part of the heavens that can be
identified as right or left, as there is for animals, which move linearly. Rather, in contrast to the
Pythagoreans, Aristotle understands right and left as applicable to the cosmos as rotary directions. The
rotary motion of the heavens, however, can be understood as either to the right or to the left,
depending on one's orientation. But, on account of the general principle of physics that things are
organized as they are for the sake of the good, the existent motion of the cosmos is identified as that
which is "from the right." In conformity with everyday Greek, the motion that is to the right is
counterclockwise, as it is when at a banquet one passes wine with one's right hand, to another seated
at one's right (Braunlich 1936). Because this is so, the uppermost part of the cosmos, the tabletop, as it
were, is the southern half. 38
This is an odd argument, on which much can be said.39The problem with the Pythagorean explanation
is not simply that it lacks an empirical basis;40after all, the Pythagoreans no doubt thought that many of
the correlations among contraries in the same column are verified by experience. Nor is it that it fails
to make use of universal teleological principles. (For the Pythagoreans, to posit a right hand side is
equivalent to positing a side that is good, and their answer to the question "why is this the right, and
not that?" like that of Aristotle, would be "because that is for the good.") 41Aristotle is rather making
two points, both of which concern the logic of scientific explanations. The first can be extrapolated
from Aristotle's insistence that right, left, and so forth do not apply to every body but only those that
are alive - such principles cannot be universal, rather, they must be proper to the genus in question. No
such distinction is made in the Pythagorean columns.42We have seen evidence from Simplicius to the
effect that the reason why the Pythagoreans took right and left to apply to the cosmos as a whole is
that they were present in the table of opposites, and as such were taken to be the principles of all
things. Likewise, their use as modes of "symbolic classification" in ritual and action suggests that no
such distinction can be made. Aristotle's criticism that, pace the Pythagoreans, right and left are to be
applied to the cosmos only insofar as it is a certain kind of thing (an animal), is in effect a criticism of
taking all opposites that are principles to have universal application. The second point is that the
principles and derivative truths need to be clearly distinguished from one another. Even if they
mutually entail each other, the ontological, causal, and hence epistemological relationships between
them are not symmetrical. Aristotle emphasizes that explanation involves recognition of those
principles that are prior, that is, that are more causally basic.
The discussion of cosmological direction offered in On the Heavens makes explicit reference to the
discussion of biological morphological orientation given in Progression of Animals (On the Heavens 2.2
284b13-4). The principles of right and left are not of universal application; rather, they are biological
notions, applicable to those living beings capable of locomotion, the animals. For this reason, scientific
accounts of the regular and necessary features of parts of substances are likewise grounded on those
indemonstrable principles pertaining to those kinds. Within the definition of an animal there is
included not only that it has the potentiality for motion but also the organs by which it moves, for
example, its two legs. 43This is not quite the same as saying that the "right" (and, by way of privation,
the "left") are included as definitional principles of animals, but it is close. For, given the existence of
two legs, the existence of a side that is "right" follows, given the additional premise that a single
substance possesses single origin of motion ( Progression of Animals 4). According to Aristotle, the

Pythagoreans are not incorrect in the assertion that right and left apply to the cosmos, but they are
incorrect in not recognizing that there is a cause or reason prior to that of the opposition between right
and left, which is the reason why right and left apply. This is why Aristotle begins his discussion of
cosmic orientation by remarking: "First, if right and left are present, we must grant that even prior
principles are present in it" (2.2 284b10-13). 44
Aristotle has already indicated that the Pythagorean analysis in terms of opposites fails to take account
of all relevant opposites and to have determined which of them have causal and explanatory
priority.45He develops this point here: the Pythagoreans are oblivious to the pair of opposites that are
primary. The directions front, back, up, down, left, and right have their primary reference in relation to
the functional parts of living things. It is for this reason that Aristotle reminds us at 285a22-25 that
because up is that out of which ( hothen) motion comes, as distinguished from the right as that from
which (aph' hou) it comes, the power (dunamis) of up is prior to that of the right.46Aristotle does not
here explicitly tell us the sense of the distinction between from whence and from which. Elsewhere we
are told that up is the source of nutrition, as the mouth of a human being is up (for which reason plants
have their roots "up"; they, like the cosmos as a whole, are oriented up-side down) ( Progression of
Animals 3 705a27-b8). Down is by definition the contrary of up. Front is the origin of the senses
(705b9-b14) - since the senses are oriented towards the object of desire, towards which an animal
moves - and back is the contrary of front; since plants don't move - they lack front and back. As we
have seen, right and left, too, are understood in terms of motion, although in a different manner from
that of front and back. In one sense of "principle," the primary principle of up and down is "living
thing," and the primary principle of right and left and up and down is "animal." Animals are
distinguished from plants on the basis of their possession of a locomotive soul. But as Aristotle
elsewhere makes clear, locomotion itself is to be understood teleologically in terms of the pursuit of
the object of desire; animals are unlike plants, which are able to access what they need while
remaining in one place ( On the Soul 3.9; 12 434b22-7). Hence "up," the principle of nutrition, is
primary, in the sense that nutrition, as the precondition of all living things, is also the precondition for
certain living things, animals capable of sensation and motion. It is primary in another sense as well:
animals move in order to eat. Right and left can only be understood functionally on the basis of
motion, which in turn can only be understood on the basis of nutrition, the morphological orientation
of which is up. I suggest that this is why Aristotle asserts that right and left have up and down as prior
principles. 47The Pythagoreans skip a step or two when they immediately apply the principles right and
left to living things, without discussion of prior principles.
Aristotle objects that the Pythagoreans applied right and left to the heaven, without applying to it up
and down which, in the case of living beings, are orientations that are prior to right and left. But, if the
heaven does not eat, which principle is prior to the orientation to the right?
I suggest that the principle that is prior to that of left and right is simply that of the good, or final cause,
of the heavenly motions. Right and left are not to be identified without appeal to the notion that the
cosmos is as it is because it, like all natural beings, has the basic features it has because that is to the
good. In terms of the Pythagorean table of opposites, the principle good/bad must be posited as prior
to the principle right/left, in order of causation and explanation. We have seen that there is some
evidence that Aristotle himself is led to attribute to the Pythagoreans themselves such an organizing

principle of the table of opposites. In an Aristotelian framework, one must say that prior to the
identification of the counterclockwise motion of the heavens as "from the right" is the universal
principle of physics that "nature does nothing in vain." 48For Aristotle comes to identify the definitional
principle by which one can make sense of the thesis that the heavenly rotation is from the right: the
right is that from which a motion is to start. Without recourse to the principle that all things are set up
for the good, it is impossible to make sense of why the celestial motions are in one direction rather
than another.
Aristotle's sole explicit treatment of the Pythagorean table of opposites is in the context of his program
of reviewing of the endoxa in order to show that they reveal no variety of causation outside of the four
he has identified (Metaphysics 1 10 993a11-16). Aristotle speculates that the elements posited by both
groups of Pythagoreans serve as material causes (986a4-8).49
He has little to say about it in this regard. (Because they are more fully worked out and show greater
theoretical sophistication, he is more interested in the accounts offered by Empedocles that similarly
attempt to account for a wide variety of natural phenomena on the basis of a plurality of material
principles. If they are unsuccessful, so, a fortiori, would be those of the Pythagoreans.) But in On the
Heavens 2, Aristotle considers in greater depth an actual example of a physical explanation worked
through by the Pythagoreans, on the basis of paired opposites, which shows a deeper appreciation of
both the strength and weakness of logical structure of the sorts of explanations that the Pythagoreans
were attempting. Aristotle comes to credit the Pythagoreans with the insight that explanations
proceed by working through the entailments that hold among associated features. But he criticizes the
Pythagoreans on the grounds that they failed to recognize the need to reveal the relations of causal
priority and posteriority that hold among the principles that are identified. The Posterior Analytics can
be understood as an attempt to systematically remedy the faults of the Pythagorean explanatory
scheme.
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Footnote

1. Following Burkert 1972, most scholars today identify these Pythagoreans with Philolaus and those
influenced by him; it is however controversial as to whether Aristotle got Philolaus right.
2. See n. 28 below.
3. The right-hand column is called a column of goods at Nicomachean Ethics 1. 6 1096b5-6 and 2.6
1106b29-30; at 1096b6-7 Aristotle tells us that "Speusippus seems to have followed them." The
context of the discussion of the "column of goods" at Metaphysics N 6 1093b11-21 indicates
that Aristotle's concern here is Academics and the way that they "separate" their principles.
At Physics 3.2 201b24-6 (= Metaphysics K 9 1066a14) we are told that "the principles in the

second column, because they are negative, are indefinite," Huffman rightly argues that Aristotle
must have had in mind the compilers of "Pythagorean" table of Metaphysics A 5, but the
passage is in a context which, according to Eudemus, applies to Platonic philosophy (Huffman
2005, 509).
4. "Because the decad seems complete and to have comprehended the total nature of numbers, they
said that there are ten things moving in the heavens."
5. In personal correspondence, Carl Huffman has pointed out to me that Burkert, to whom Zhmud
appeals, accepts as a genuine Pythagorean acousma Iamblichus, Life of Pythagoras 85, which
identifies the oracle of Apolla with the tetraks, the numbers one through four, which total ten.
Further, in correspondence (and now, in Huffman 2014) he pointed out how at 986a28-9
Aristotle confesses ignorance as to whether the table of ten opposites is earlier or later than
Alcmaeon; if the table was Academic Aristotle would have known, as he was a member. This is
significant evidence that the early Pythagoreans attributed special importance to the number
ten. Huffman holds that in the absence of more decisive evidence, the table of ten opposites, as
reported by Aristotle, ought to be accepted as authentically Pythagorean (see Huffman 2014).
6. Zhmud denies that Pythagoreans prior to Philolaus attributed any special importance to number;
Riedweg 2008, 80-3, trusts the Aristotelian evidence on this.
7. It is significant that the "jumbled" nature of Aristotle's list includes the ethical opposites of good and
bad. For at Metaphysics [Lambda] 7 1072b31-2 Aristotle says that neither the
Pythagoreans nor Speusippus posited the most beautiful and best as a primary principle.
Burkert points to this passage as evidence that the table derives from Speusippus (Burkert
1972, 52 n. 118); presumably he is pointing to the contradiction between the presence of the
good in the table and Aristotle's denial that the good is a Pythagorean principle. But the
passage can also be used as evidence that the table does not derive from Speusippus! I
speculate that Aristotle's point here is that the Pythagoreans did not appeal to the good as
a final cause; consider how at Metaphysics I 5 986a4-6 he speculates that the good and the
other opposites present in the table serve as material causes.
8. The presence of limit and unlimited, or some variant of these, suggests followers of Philolaus or
Plato as its origin, not the Pythagoreans whom Aristotle distinguishes from those taking a
special interest in number. But even if the Pythagoreans responsible for the table are distinct
from Philolaus, and, as Huffman 1993 has argued, Philolaus emphasized the distinction
between limiters and unlimited as a result of reflection on Milesian explanations, it is likely that
one Pythagorean group would have had an interest in the work of another.
9. But see n. 5.
10. Cornford [1912] 1991 is a Durkheimian attempt to show how early Greek philosophy emerged as a
matter of rational speculation built on, and maintaining the basis of, Greek myth, which he
interprets as a "collective representation" of the social structures underlying early Greek
communities.
11. Hertz thus writes: "Sacred power, source of life, truth, beauty, virtue, the rising sun, the male sex,
and - I can add - the right side; all these terms are interchangeable, as are their contraries, they
designate under many aspects the same category of things, a common nature, the same
orientation towards one of the two poles of the mystical world" (Hertz 1960, 103). It is in a note
to this passage that Hertz references the Pythagorean table of opposites as reflecting and

deriving from this ontological scheme: "The correspondence with the table that I have set out is
perfect: the Pythagoreans have simply defined and given shape to extremely ancient popular
ideas" (ibid., 158, n. 50). For Hertz, social organization followed a shared understanding of the
metaphysical structure of the cosmos. According to the account of Cornford [1912] 1991, the
priority is the reverse of that posited by Hertz: social structures, specific to particular groups,
determine modes of classifying the world and practices. He applies this analysis to the
Pythagorean Table of Opposites in ibid., 68-70.
12. For an account of work influenced by a reaction to Hertz's work on the anthropological significance
of dualistic classification, see Parking 1996, 59-86. Parking's discussion, like the anthropological
work he discusses, does not focus on the metaphysical commitments implicit in tables of
opposites. It rather concerns the structural features of the oppositions and the relation
between oppositions in ritual and in the social order.
13. Thus, Vidal-Naquet writes that the Pythagorean tables express "collective representations" (VidalNaquet 1986, 64). Cf. Humphreys: "In my view the most important aspect of their [i.e. the
structuralists'] approach is the idea that the aim of the analysis of myth and ritual is not to
produce some kind of 'explanation' of each rite or myth, but to reconstruct a mental map of the
concepts and symbols used in the whole body of Greek myth and ritual which represents the
patterns of association and opposition which recur in the material, and does not depend on any
advance preconceptions about the 'meaning' of symbols" (Humphreys 1978, 27). Cf. also how
Burkert 1972, 468-479, employs the anthropological notion of symbolism to understand the
importance of numbers in Pythagorean thought.
14. Burkert writes "The question of what is scientific depends more upon form, method, and proof
than upon the content or the practical function. May it not be that the conceptual and scientific
impulse simply provides a new form for an ancient and pre-scientific lore or attitude?" (Burkert
1972, 206).
15. The reliability of Iamblichus as evidence for an Aristotelian source here is bolstered by his use
of sumbolon in a way atypical for him, on which see below.
16. Conceivably the uttering of the name of an opposite could have been understood as a sumbolon in
this sense, but there is no evidence to support this.
17. The Suda provides evidence that as early as the fourth century the term sumbolos was already
being used in its neoplatonic sense: "[Anaximander son of Anaximander], from Miletos, the
Younger, a historian. His floruit is the reign of Artaxerxes who was called Mnemon [404-358
BC]. He wrote an Explanation of Pythagorean Symbols, including such sayings as 'do not step
over the beam of a balance,' 'do not poke the fire with a knife,' 'do not eat from a loaf of bread
before it is divided,' etc." (Wecowski 2014). Wecowski convincingly argues that "In principle,
one might expect [sigma][Iuml][mu][beta]o[lambda][alpha] to be not so much a medium of
Pythagorean teaching (such teaching would be duly called [GREEK SMALL LETTER ALPHA WITH
PSILI][kappa]o[Iuml][sigma][mu][alpha][tau][alpha]), but a secret code or token of identification
of the sect and to consist of a 'sign' and an 'answer'. . . . Be that as it may, A.'s explanation must
have looked similar to those that we find in Diogenes Laertios, Porphyry, or in Hippolytus. A.
was most probably the first scholar to comment on the Pythagorean 'symbols' thus triggering
the whole consecutive line of scholarship, including Aristotle." If Wecowski is right, Pythagorean
utterances were called sumbola in the term's original sense, that which is accompanied by a

counterpart, not in the sense of referring to an utterance that had an analogical meaning. This
is evidence that Iamblichus' use of sumbolon in respect to the table of opposites directly or
indirectly derives from early, genuinely Pythagorean material.
18. Cf. Riedweg 2008, 65: "In general, a very extensive sacralization of all areas of life seems typical of
the vita Pythagorica. The boundaries between profane-moralizing and religious-ritual
admonitions therefore sometimes become fluid." As Bremmer points out, the Pythagorean way
of life involved both Weber's Wertrationalität (the belief in the inherent superiority of a way of
life) and Zweckrationalität (the belief that a way of life is superior because of the good things it
brings) (Bremmer 1999, 76).
19. For Kahn, the practices prescribed by the Pythagorean way of life serve primarily to distinguish the
in-group from the out-group (Kahn 2001, 10). I am suggesting that many of the practices have
the goal of bringing about positively valued attributes and things. See Iamblichus: "All of those
[precepts] that determine what should or should not be done aim at conformity with the
divine. This is a principle, and the whole way of life is ordered with a view to following God"
(Dillon and Hershbell 1991, 15-17).
20. See Hallpike: "Dualistic classification may therefore occur at any level of thought and is in any case
as much an accommodation to the "two-ness" of reality as an expression of a binary propensity
of the human mind. What is developmentally significant is the extent to which binary
classifications are systematized, either into an integrated explanatory framework such as that
of the Chinese or into exhaustive and hierarchically organized, goal-oriented, classificatory
procedures" (Hallpike 1980, 234).
21. The point is well made by Riedweg 2008, 35: "In passing let us note that these Pythagoreans . . .
could in a certain sense be considered forerunners of modern structuralism, which is primarily
concerned with hierarchical chains of binary oppositions in texts and other objects of analysis."
22. When he does so, it is as part of his usual survey of the endoxa, the commonly held views that are
to guide dialectical inquiry leading to the acquisition of first principles. Aristotle's appeal
to endoxa is often followed by his own analysis, after which he returns to the endoxa, showing
how they are erroneous or only partially true. But when Aristotle makes appeal to the
associations given in a table of opposites, he never revisits that table itself, in order to indicate
its deficiencies. This suggests that he himself, as well as his audience, accepts the table of
opposites as a schematization of intelligible conceptual and causal relationships, safely
embedded in everyday ways of understanding the world.
23. See, for example, On the Soul 2.5 287b22-288a13, in which the motion of the heavens is said to be
to the right, on the common assumption that motion to the right is better than motion to the
left, and Aristotle's own teleological premise that the cosmos is set up in such a way that to the
right is the best. On the argument, see Goldin 2010. To these examples there may be added the
association of male with strong and female with weak, on which see, for example, History of
Animals 9.1 608a35-b15 and Politics 1.13 1260a13. Aristotle is committed to this association,
which is reflected in his report of the Pythagorean columns, but when he appeals to it he does
not refer to the Pythagorean table.
24. Granted, outside of odd and even, none of the opposites listed have a place on the Pythagorean
table, as Aristotle himself reports to us. I suggest that in saying that the principles are "from"

the same columns, Aristotle is not saying that they themselves are items included in these
columns, but that they can be understood as deriving from them.
25. From the context it is clear that Aristotle's immediate target is figures in the Academy, but, as I
have argued above, however much Speusippus and others determine the number and identity
of the table's paired opposites, its underlying logic persisted.
26. Aristotle himself employs this principle at Parts of Animals 3.7 670b18-22, when explaining why the
left side of the body is colder than the right: "Each of a pair of opposites is distinguished [from
the other] by being in the column of its kind (pros ten suggene sustoichian). For example, right
is opposite to left and hot is opposite to cold, and they are [respectively] in the same column
with one another, in the manner described."
27. See also Fr. B4: "Alcmaeon said that the equilibrium (isonomia) of the powers (wet, dry, cold, hot,
bitter, sweet, etc.) maintains health but that monarchy among them leads to disease." The list
of opposed powers is here explicitly given as indeterminate. It is not clear whether Alcmaeon's
opposites were intended to be of universal application, as (I argue below) those of the
Pythagorean table were thought to be (see Huffman 2013).
28. Simplicius refers to the Aristotelian Collection of Pythagorean Opinions at Commentary on On the
Heavens 386, 22-3. This is not in itself decisive proof of direct access, since it is possible that
Simplicius could have access to the Aristotelian material second-hand, via Iamblichus' lost
treatise, On the Pythagorean Sects, on which Simplicius wrote a commentary. (I owe this point
to Hans Baltussen from personal communication.) See also Commentary on On the Heaven 392,
24-32 (on which see note 38 below), where Simplicius reports an emendation of the text of
the Collection suggested by Alexander of Aphrodisias.
29. An alternative translation is "which he said . . ."
30. See also 383, 13-15: "The Pythagoreans posited right and left within the ten rows, which they said
[included] the principles common to all things, which is why they are principles of heaven, as
well."
31. That is not to say that this inference is the only evidence Aristotle has for the Pythagoreans'
attribution of right and left to the cosmos. As Huffman writes, "Aristotle must know of some
oral or written assertion by the Pythagoreans that the cosmos as a whole has a right and a left,
he cannot be deducing it himself from the universal applicability of the categories" (Huffman
1993, 225).
32. This is also the judgment of Huffman (1993, 225).
33. This is apparently the interpretation of Simplicius, who, as we have seen, has at least indirect
access to Aristotle's more substantive account of the table of opposites in the Collection of
Pythagorean Opinions. He tells us that the Pythagoreans "took each of the ten opposites
(hekasten antithesin tÅn deka) that are of the same kind (suggeneias) to be indications of each
other (sunemphainousan)" (In Cael. 386, 12-4). The translation of Mueller 2004, 33, "they took
each of their ten antitheses to indicate simultaneously all the antitheses akin to it," does not
give the right sense. It is not one paired opposition that stands in a special relation with another
opposition, but one of the opposites that stands in a special relation with another opposite,
insofar as it is found in the same column. Though antithesis usually has the sense of
"opposition" (LSJ s.v.) it can also have the sense of "opposite" as it does at Aristotle, Eudemian
Ethics 1224a20.

34. The old Oxford Translation "they identify motion with 'difference' or 'inequality' or 'nonbeing'" is an
overtranslation. (The same mistake is made in translating Physics 3.4 203a10-11, in which the
Pythagoreans are said to hold to apeiron einai to artion as "the Pythagoreans are said to
identify the infinite with the uneven." In accordance with what I have argued is Aristotle's
understanding of the column of opposites, Aristotle is saying that according to the
Pythagoreans that which is indefinite is also (in some sense) that which is even, that is, anything
characterized by evenness is also somehow characterized by infinitude. Cf. Simplicius, who
reports the testimony of Hermodoros, according to whom Plato classified the equal, the
stationary, and that which is in tune, as in the class of the limited on account of how they, in
contrast to their opposites, do not admit of the more and the less ( Commentary on the
Physics 247, 30-248, 30).
35. Aristotle would likely grant that it is anachronistic to take such schemes as positing one opposite
as predicated of another with the same column; he is well aware that the grammatical
distinction between subject and predicate, and the correlative ontological distinction between
substance and non-substance, awaits Plato's - and his own - insights. See Simplicius' explicit
quotation of Aristotle's careful formulation, in his Collection of Pythagorean Opinions, of the
relation between opposites in the same column: "they took each of the ten oppositions to at
the same time indicate (sunemphainousan) all of the antitheses akin (sungeneias) to it. . . . It
was therefore reasonable (eikotÅs) for them to use right and left to refer to (edelÅsan) the
other spatial antitheses" (In Cael. 386, 19-23). Aristotle here seems to be going out of his way to
avoid saying that one opposite is or is predicated of an opposite in the same column.
36. If one conjoins the thesis that all of the opposites are of universal application with the thesis that
all of the opposites are mutually predicated with each other, we arrive at the conclusion that
there are only two opposites; the columns systematically lay out not a multiplicity of principles,
but a multiplicity of names for the same principles. This is apparently the understanding of
Eudorus, as quoted in Simplicius, Commentary on the Physics 181, 22: "I say that the
Pythagoreans isolate the one as the principle of all things, but in another respect they introduce
two highest principles. They refer to these two principles by many names. One of them is called
'ordered,' 'definite,' 'known,' 'male,' 'odd,' 'right,' 'light,'" and Plutarch, On the Pythagorean
Life 38, 7-8: "Of the opposed powers he calls the better one 'unit,' 'light,' 'right,' 'equal,' 'at rest'
and 'straight' and the worse one 'dyad,' 'dark,' 'left,' 'unequal,' 'curved' and 'moving.'" Stobaeus
attributes to the Pythagorean Eurusus the view that there are two opposed natures,
but phuseis could either refer to a kind, or to any kind of characteristic or similarity shared by
members of a kind.
37. All translations are by the author.
38. Aristotle reports that that the Pythagoreans made "us (i.e. the denizens of Europe) above and on
the right side and those in the other hemisphere below and on the left side (the fact being the
exact opposite)" (DC 2.2 285b25-7). Given that Aristotle comes to identify right and left, as
applied to the cosmos not as determinate locations, but as rotary directions, what does he
mean here in saying that although the Pythagoreans put Europe on the right, it is actually on
the left? Simplicius provides the answer: "Is it rather the case that 'up and towards the right" is
here said not according to his own preferred way of speaking, but according to that of the
Pythagoreans? For they arrange ( sunetatton) up and front with the right, and down and back

with the left" (Commentary on On the Heaven 392, 21-24). Simplicius is telling us that Aristotle
is thinking in terms of what we have argued is the logic of the table of opposites; up, front, and
right are all coordinated, so that opposites found on the same column of the table are
associated in a way that allows us to say that one opposite is the other. Thus, the upper is also
said to be on the right. Because if we are on the lower half of the cosmos, Aristotle says, if we
are to follow the logic of the table of opposites, we are also to be said to be to the left.
39. I have elsewhere discussed it, in light of the tension between Aristotle's own skeptical remarks
concerning the possibility of cosmological knowledge and the ideal of scientific explanation as
revealing the intelligible structure of things (Goldin 2010).
40. Lennox has argued that Aristotle broaches the issue in order to provide "an object lesson in
empirical cosmology, countering the approach found in Plato's Timaeus and in Pythagorean
doctrine," and that the account that he develops is intended to show what an adequate
scientific account on the matter would look like (Lennox 2009, 212). It needs to make the
subject matter intelligible on the basis of both empirical observation and overarching
teleological principles, applicable to more than one kind.
41. Cf. Aristotle's discussion of the place occupied by the good in the Pythagorean Table of Opposites
can be found in Nicomachean Ethics 1.6 1096b5-8. Aristotle had argued against those who take
goodness to follow from being eternal, and proceeds to say that it is preferable to associate
goodness and unity: "The Pythagoreans seem to give a more plausible account of the good,
when they place the one in the column of goods; and it is they that Speusippus seems to have
followed." Here the superordinate term is goodness, and unity is derivative from that. Aristotle
has in mind the use of the column of opposites by Speusippus, who goes beyond his
Pythagorean predecessors in laying out a metaphysical system that posits goodness as
posterior to unity (see Taran 1981, 44, and Burkert 1972, 36, n. 38). The priority may well be
reversed at Nicomachean Ethcs 2.6 1106b29-30: to gar kakon tou apeirou, hÅs hoi pythagoreioi
eikazon, to d' agathon tou peparasmenou. Nonetheless Simplicius, and perhaps his source,
Aristotle in On the Pythagorean Doctrines, goes so far as to make sense of the Pythagorean
table as structured by the opposition of the good and the bad. "The Pythagoreans placed all
antitheses in two columns, one better, one worse - or one column of good and one of the bad"
(Commentary on On the Heaven 386, 9-11). (Cf. Metaphysics N 6 1093b11-14, where Aristotle,
apparently running together the two groups of Pythagoreans that he had distinguished in A 5,
reports that those who posit numbers as causes of natural things say that the well (to eu)
belongs to numbers, as they post odd, straight, square, and the powers of numbers - all but the
last of which belong to the table of opposites of Metaphysics A 5; odd is a power of number as
it is in the column of the beautiful.) Simplicius may be saying that the opposition of the good
and the bad is the principle behind all of the other principles, in which case his source Aristotle
may at one point have attributed to the Pythagoreans the very insight that in On the
Heavens they are said to have failed to realize. If the Pythagoreans indeed had explicitly labeled
one of the columns as good, then Aristotle's criticism of them would be even more pointed:
they fail to show how it is the case that one side of the cosmos is the right hand side on account
of what they themselves accept as the more primary principle, that of the good (cf. Plutarch On
Compliancy 38, 7-8).

42. Aristotle makes the same general point in Metaphysics N 1093b14-21, where he questions certain
theoretical associations made by the same thinkers that posited the table of opposites: these
concerned not the association of items opposed to other items but the association between
numbers and features of the world such as seasons. The cause of something must be in the
same genus as the effects, for which reason numbers cannot cause seasons (see Annas 1976,
219): "Although Aristotle sounds less unsympathetic to them [the associations posited by his
opponents] than one might expect, he cannot afford to allow that they are significant, for this
would surely undermine the autonomy of different fields of inquiry, something which Aristotle
is strongly committed to.
43. See for example Parts of Animals 1.4 644b7-11.
44. Evidence that Archytas was responsible for the insight that the table of opposites is deficient in not
clarifying relationships of causal priority and posteriority is found in Simplicius Commentary on
the Physics 431.4-16: "It is better to say that these <opposites> are causes, as does Archytas"
(431.12) (Huffman 2005). Archytas is said to fault those who identify motion with what is
uneven and principles that have the same bearing (epi tauto pherei) as these (such as the
unequal). Huffman 2005, 508-15 convincingly argues that these are the Pythagoreans of the
table of opposites; he thinks it likely that Simplicius' source Eudemus included a discussion of
the Pythagorean table in his account relating the accounts of motion given by Archytas and
Plato. "The Pythagoreans of the table of opposites similarly regard motion as being essentially
indefinite and associate it with characteristics of the "indefinite" column in the table of
opposites. Archytas' point of view is quite different. Motion is not in its nature disorderly. It
does arise because of an inequality or an imbalance" (Huffman 2005, 521).
45. As Carl Huffman has pointed out to me, Philolaus (who is presumably not among the Pythagoreans
in question) would have identified one pair of opposites as causally prior to the other in the
table: the pair limit/unlimited.
46. At On the Heavens 2.2 285a12-22, Aristotle again faults the Pythagoreans with neglecting up and
down as principles prior to right and left. He reverts here to a nonfunctional, geometrical
account of dimension, pointing out that up and down are principles of length, while right and
left are principles of breadth, and that length is prior to breadth. It is not clear why Aristotle
thinks that length is to be taken as prior to breadth.
47. This is the interpretation of Simplicius as well: "<Aristotle's> fourth objection [at 285a22ff] in
addition to these is that if up is the starting point of the motion which is characterised as
growth, right that from which the motion starts, and forward that to which it proceeds, and the
motion of growth is more important and more substantial ( ousiÅdestera) for an animal than
local motion, it is clear that up will possess a more important power as a principle than the
other differences. So their using right and left and leaving out up and down is absurd"
(Commentary on On the Heavens 385a23-9; Mueller 2004, 32). For animal, the power of
locomotion features in the essence just as much as the power of growth. So how is the latter
more substantial? For a neoplatonist such as Simplicius, a species is part of its genus;
accordingly, the whole is more of a substance than its part (see, for example,
Proclus Commentary on the Parmenides 650, 26-34).

48. On this principle, which features prominently in the discussion of biological directionality
in Progression of Animals 2 704b11-705a2, see Lennox 2001, 205-22. The centrality of this
principle to Aristotle's argument is emphasized in Lennox 2009.
49. "Element" must here be synonymous with "principle" (see Metaphysics [Delta] 1 1013a20). No
evidence is given for taking the opposites to have the status of material causes. We note
however that from an Aristotelian point of view, the opposites fall into a number of the
categories of being, for example, quality (light and dark), quantity (odd and even), and relation
(right and left). Noticeably missing from the table are any terms that Aristotle would recognize
as substantial. So if Aristotle is presuming that the Pythagoreans' explananda were material
substances, which they acknowledged as coming to be and passing away through the
conjunction and interplay of more basic principles, he may well have inferred that these
Pythagoreans held that material substances are constituted out of the various basic opposed
nonsubstantial characteristics which somehow served as preexisting matter. Whatever the
grounds for his interpretation, it is patently speculative, for which reason it does not play an
important role in the account of the Pythagorean table that is the focus of the present paper.
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